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Abstract
Discussions about education often focus on the purposes that should be achieved or the outcomes that should 
be produced. In this paper I approach the question of the purpose of education differently, by asking what the 
work of teachers and other educators should focus. The answer I propose is that this work is about arousing the 
desire in children and young people for wanting to exist in the world in what I refer to as a “grown-up” way. I 
explain my use of the idea of “grown-up-ness,” where I argue that we should not think of this as the outcome of 
a developmental trajectory but as a way in which human beings can try to exist in and with the world. This sug-
gests, as I explain, that central to the work of education is the interruption of ways in which children and young 
people are entirely self-centred and self-focused, thus turning them towards the world in which their existence 
as grown-up subjects can only take place. Education that is focused on this has a task to provide time, space and 
curricular forms through which children and young people can work “on” their grown-up-ness. And education 
needs to provide sustenance so that children and young people can be supported and nourished in their task of 
trying to exist in a grown-up way.
Keywords
education; teaching; grown-up-ness; egocentrism; interruption; curriculum
Resumen
Las discusiones sobre educación a menudo están enfocadas en los propósitos que deberían lograrse o en los 
resultados que deberían producirse. En este artículo abordamos la cuestión del propósito de la educación de 
forma diferente, al preguntarnos en qué debería enfocarse el trabajo de los profesores y demás educadores. 
La respuesta que proponemos es que el objetivo de este trabajo es despertar en los niños y en los jóvenes 
el deseo de querer existir en este mundo, de la forma que denominamos como “adulta”. Explicamos nuestra 
idea de “crecimiento”, sobre la que argumentaremos que no deberíamos pensar en ella como el resultado 
de una trayectoria de desarrollo, sino como una forma en la que los seres humanos pueden tratar de existir 
en y con el mundo. Esto sugiere que es importante, en el trabajo educativo, interrumpir las formas en las 
que los niños y los jóvenes están completamente enfocados en sí mismos, llevándolos así al mundo en que 
solo se puede dar su existencia como sujetos adultos. La educación enfocada en eso tiene la tarea de ofrecer 
tiempo, espacio y formas curriculares a través de las cuales los niños y los jóvenes puedan trabajar “en” su 
crecimiento. Adicionalmente, la educación debe proveer sustento para que niños y jóvenes puedan recibir 
apoyo y nutrirse en su tarea de intentar existir de forma adulta.
Palabras clave
educación; enseñanza; crecimiento; egocentrismo; interrupción; currículo
Resumo
As discussões sobre educação estão focadas, com frequência, nos propósitos que deve-
riam ser conquistados ou nos resultados que deveriam ser produzidos. Neste artigo 
abordamos a questão do propósito da educação de forma diferente, perguntando em 
que deveria estar focado o trabalho dos professores e outros educadores. A resposta que 
propomos é que o objetivo deste trabalho é despertar o desejo, nas crianças e jovens, 
de querer existir nesse mundo, da forma que denominamos como “adulta”. Explicamos 
nossa ideia de “crescimento”, sobre a qual argumentamos que não deveríamos pensar 
nela como o resultado de uma trajetória de desenvolvimento, mas como em uma forma 
na que os seres humanos podem tentar existir em e com o mundo. Isso sugere que é 
importante, no trabalho educacional, a interrupção de formas nas que as crianças e os 
jovens estão inteiramente focados em si mesmos, levando-os assim para o mundo em 
que sua existência como sujeitos adultos só pode acontecer. A educação focalizada nisso 
tem a tarefa de fornecer tempo, espaço e formas curriculares através das quais crianças 
e jovens possam trabalhar “em” seu crescimento. Adicionalmente, a educação precisa 
prover sustento para que crianças e jovens possam ser apoiados e nutridos em sua tarefa 
de tentar existir de forma adulta.
Palavras-chave
educação; ensino; crescimento; egocentrismo; interrupção; currículo
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In this article I explore a simple and, in a sense, very basic question, which I have phrased as the question “What is the educational task?”
I am aware that the phrasing of this question is 
not ideal, particularly not where it concerns the word 
task. In a number of Germanic languages, there are 
much more precise and much more interesting words 
to denote what I am after. In German there are the 
words Aufgabe and Auftrag, which are very close to 
the Dutch words opgave and opdracht. What these 
words try to hint at are things that need to be done, 
that are there for us to do when we find ourselves in 
a certain situation or position, such as the position 
of being a teacher or educator. This is less about a 
task that needs to be performed or a job that needs 
to be done as it is about a responsibility we encoun-
ter. Interestingly, the words Gabe and gave actually 
mean “gift,” so that Aufgabe and opgave refer to a task 
that is given to us, a task that comes with the job, so 
to speak, or the responsibility that comes with the 
position. Auftrag and opdracht have the words tra-
gen and dragen in them, which mean “to carry,” and 
that is what the task given to us is asking from us as 
well. That we carry this task. What I seek to express 
through the question of the educational task, there-
fore, is that education is not just anything we want 
it to be, but that it comes with a particular Aufgabe, 
a particular responsibility, a particular imperative, 
we might even say.
The answer I will suggest in this article is that the 
educational task consists in making the grown-up 
existence of another human being in and with the 
world possible. Or, with an even more precise for-
mulation: the educational task consists in arousing 
the desire in another human being for wanting to 
exist in and with the world in a grown-up way, that 
is, as subject. There are at least two aspects to this 
answer that need further exploration. One is the idea 
of “grown-up-ness,” and the other the use of the word 
existence. To begin with the latter: to use the word 
existence means that I wish to focus on the ways in 
which human beings exist—that is, in short, on how 
they are, and not on the question who they are. If the 
latter is the question of identity, the former is the 
question of subjectivity or, in slightly more accurate 
terms, it is the question of human subject-ness or of 
the human “condition” of being-subject. Both ques-
tions—the question who I am and the question how 
I am—are of course legitimate questions, also in the 
context of education. But they are very different ques-
tions, and it is important not to conflate them, neither 
at the level of concepts—the concepts of “identity” 
and “subject-ness” are not interchangeable—nor 
at the level of what these concepts seek to express.
As I will discuss in more detail below, I approach 
“grown-up-ness”—admittedly a slightly awkward 
word—not as a developmental stage or the out-
come of a developmental trajectory, but in existential 
terms, that is, as a particular “quality” or way of exist-
ing. What distinguishes a grown-up way of existing 
from a non-grown-up way is that the grown-up way 
acknowledges the alterity and integrity of what and 
who is other, whereas in the non-grown-up way this is 
not “on the radar.” The grown-up way acknowledges, 
in other words, that the world out there is indeed “out 
there,” and is neither a world of our own making nor 
a world that is just at our disposal, that is, a world 
with which we can do whatever we want or fancy. 
“The world” here refers both to the natural and to the 
social world, both to the world of things and to the 
world of beings. It refers, more concretely, both to our 
planet and everything on it, and to the other human 
beings we encounter on this planet. It refers, with an 
interesting word proposed by Alfonso Lingis (1994, 
p. 123), both to the earth and to the “earthlings” 
inhabiting the earth. To acknowledge the alterity and 
integrity of this world is not to be understood as an 
act of generosity on my side to let what and who is 
other exist. It is, in other words, not my decision to 
let the world exist or not. It rather is my decision to 
give the alterity and integrity of the world a place in 
my life—or not, of course.
What is the justification for suggesting that the 
educational task is to make the grown-up existence of 
another human being in and with the world possible? 
In an absolute sense there is no justification for this 
and, in this regard, the suggestion is literally ground-
less. Yet this does not preclude that this suggestion 
may be meaningful, particularly when compared to 
alternative views about what the educational task 
might be. One point to highlight here is that it is actu-
ally only in the world that we can really exist, since 
when we withdraw ourselves from the world, we 
end up existing only with and for ourselves—which 
is a rather poor and self-absorbed way of existing, 
if it is to exist at all. To exist in and with the world, 
thus, always raises the question of the relationship 
between my existence and the existence of the world. 
And here again, at least as a starting point, we can 
say that to exist in and with the world without mak-
ing space for what exists there as well, is not really 
to exist in the world. The challenge, therefore, is to 
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1 exist in the world without considering oneself as 
the centre, origin or ground of the world—which is 
exactly how Philippe Meirieu describes the “student 
subject” (élève-sujet), namely as the one who is able 
to live in the world, without occupying the centre of 
the world1 (Meirieu, 2007, p. 96).
But perhaps the even more difficult question is 
why we should think of this as an educational issue, 
rather than as something that each of us should figure 
out in our own lives. Why, in other words, should we 
even consider the suggestion that it would be the 
task—and hence the responsibility and perhaps even 
the duty—of one human being to make the grown-up 
existence of another human being possible? We could 
respond to this question by referring to the fact that 
this seems to be what educators have always been 
doing, that it is key to what it means to be a parent 
and that it is key to what it means to be a teacher, 
and that what I am trying to do is simply to explore 
what this might mean in our times. We could also say 
that the ambition to make the grown-up existence of 
another human being possible expresses an interest 
in freedom and, more specifically, an interest in the 
freedom of the other, and that this is key to what edu-
cation ought to be about (Biesta & Säfström, 2011,). 
I do think that this is how we might articulate the 
educational interest and hence the educational task, 
but I do not think that this automatically amounts 
to a justification of it. After all, the promise of lib-
eration has too often turned into another exercise of 
power (see, for example, Spivak, 1988; Biesta, 2010a; 
and, for a wider discussion, Andreotti, 2011), which 
means that in these matters we should proceed care-
fully and with not too many pretensions.
I will present my reflections on the educational 
task in five relatively brief steps, partly in connec-
tion to some ideas I have presented in more detail 
in earlier publications, and partly highlighting with 
more precision notions of “existence” and “grown-
up-ness.” I will first look at the notion of subjectiv-
ity or subject-ness and will try to articulate what it 
means to exist “as subject.” I will pursue this a little 
further by arguing next that existential matters are 
ultimately first person matters rather than matters 
of theory. I will explain this distinction and indicate 
what this means for the question of being-subject 
and more specifically the idea of uniqueness. From 
here I will turn to the question of what it means to 
exist in the world—a question I will seek to answer by 
highlighting what it means not to be in the world. This 
will allow me to say a bit more about the distinction 
1 In French: “Un élève-sujet est capable de vivre dans le monde 
sans occuper le centre du monde.”
between grown-up and non-grown-up ways of being 
in the world and the importance of the distinction 
between the desired and the desirable. In the fifth 
and final step, I will reflect on the educational “work” 
that might contribute to making the grown-up exis-
tence of another human being in and with the world 
possible. I conclude the article with a brief reflection 
on the role of power and authority in educational 
relationships and on what this means for teaching 
and the teacher.
The Subject is Subject
Given that I have suggested that what we are talking 
about is the subject-ness of the human being and not 
its identity, the first question to ask if what it means 
to be a subject. We can answer this question in two 
ways, either by looking at the subject itself and then 
trying to find out what the subject is, or by looking 
away from the subject and then asking what is means 
for the subject to exist. Here I pursue the second 
option, taking inspiration from Sartre’s dictum that 
“existence precedes essence,” that is, that we first of 
all exist, that we “find” ourselves in existence, and 
that any answer to the question of who we are comes 
afterwards.2 While attempts to answer the question 
of what the subject is, are not necessarily meaning-
less, they come, in a sense, always too late in relation 
to our existence itself. This means that while they 
might help to clarify dimensions of the human condi-
tion, they are not able to ground it. If, taking inspira-
tion from Heidegger, we take the idea of existence in 
a literal sense, we can already begin to see one aspect 
of the existence of the subject, namely that to exists 
as subject does not mean to be with oneself—to be 
identical with oneself—but rather to be “outside” of 
oneself, that is, in some way to “stand out” (ek-sist) 
towards the world and be “thrown” into it.
The main insight I wish to highlight about the 
existence of the subject and our existence as subject 
is that, to a large degree, our subject-ness is not in 
our own hands, which may even mean that it is not 
in our hands at all. The author who I have found most 
helpful in making sense of this aspect of our subject-
ness is Hannah Arendt, particularly her ideas on 
action (which, in Arendt’s work, is a technical term 
with a very precise definition). Action—which for 
Arendt (1958) is one of the three modalities of the 
active life, the vita activa—first of all means to take 
2 Sartre writes in Existentialism is a humanism (Sartre, 2007 
[1946]) that “man first of all exists, encounters himself, 
surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards” 
(p. 22).
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initiative, that is, to begin something. Unlike many 
philosophers who emphasise the mortality of the 
human being, Arendt (1958) looks in the opposite 
direction, that is, in the capacity of the human to be 
a beginning and a beginner. Arendt compares action 
to the fact of birth, since with each birth something 
“uniquely new” comes into the world (Arendt, 1958, 
p. 178). But it is not just at the moment of birth that 
this happens. Through our “words and deeds,” we 
continuously bring new beginnings into the world.
Beginning is, however, only half of what action 
is about, because whether our beginnings will be of 
any consequence, whether our beginnings will “come 
into the world” (Biesta, 2006), depends entirely on 
whether and how others will take up our begin-
nings—and “taking up” needs to be understood in the 
broadest possible sense, so as to include responding 
to such beginnings, repeating such beginnings, taking 
such beginnings as a cue for further initiatives, and so 
on. This is why Arendt (1958, p. 184) writes that the 
“agent” is not an author or a producer, but a subject in 
the twofold sense of the word, namely as the one who 
began an action and the one who suffers from and is 
literally subjected to its consequences. The upshot of 
this is that our “capacity” for action—which in this 
sense is precisely not a capacity we have or possess—
crucially depends on the ways in which others take 
up our beginnings. In this sense, we can say that our 
subject-ness is not in our own hands, which we might 
indeed summarise, as Simon Critchely (1999) has 
done, by saying that “the subject is subject” (p. 63).
Although the uptake by others of our initiatives 
frustrated our beginnings, Arendt (1958) emphasises 
again and again that the “impossibility to remain 
unique masters of what [we] do” (p. 244) is at the 
very condition and the only condition under which 
our beginnings can become real, that is, can come 
into the world. It is therefore also the only condi-
tion under which we can come into the world, that 
is, can exist as subjects. While it might be tempting 
to want to control the ways in which others take up 
our beginnings, the problem is that, as soon as we do 
so, we begin to deprive others of their opportunities 
for action, their opportunities to begin and to exist 
as subjects. We would then be after a world where 
one person can act—can be a subject—and everyone 
else is just a follower, and hence an object of the one 
who is subject. Arendt (1958) concludes, therefore, 
that action is never possible in isolation—which also 
means that we can never exist as subject in isolation. 
Arendt (1958) goes even as far as to argue that “to 
be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act” 
(p. 188). This, in turn, leads her to the simple but 
profound statement that “plurality is the condition of 
human action” (p. 8), namely that it is only under the 
condition of plurality that action for all— and hence 
subject-ness for all—is possible. It is important not 
to read this as an empirical statement, but rather 
as the normative “core” of Arendt’s work, which is 
explicitly committed to a world in which everyone 
has the opportunity to act and exist as subject (see 
also Biesta, 2010b).
Uniqueness as Irreplaceability
Whereas Arendt helps us to give meaning to the idea 
that our subject-ness is not in our hands but to a large 
degree dependent on what others do with our initia-
tives, there are still two limitations to her approach; 
limitations that in a sense are connected. One limita-
tion is that Arendt provides us with a theory about 
human subject-ness, and thus approaches the ques-
tion of subject-ness from what we might call “a third 
person perspective.” While her insights are illuminat-
ing, they nonetheless try to give a description of the 
condition of being-subject from the “outside,” so to 
speak, rather than from the point of view of the exis-
tence of the subject itself—which we might refer to as 
a “first person perspective.” The second limitation is 
that Arendt provides a general account of the condi-
tion of human subject-ness rather than an account of 
each human subject in its uniqueness. To put it a bit 
crudely: while Arendt gets us closer to understand-
ing what it means for subjects to exist, she does not 
provide us with an argument for why it might matter 
that each individual human subject exists. Perhaps 
these observations sound vague and strange when 
made in this abstract way. But they are precisely what 
is at stake in the way in which Emmanuel Levinas 
approaches the question of human subject-ness, in 
that he tries to give an “account” of subject-ness, not 
in the form of a theory but from a first person per-
spective. Here, subject-ness appears as something I 
have to “figure out” and that no one else can figure 
out for me, nor that it is something I can figure out for 
anyone else. And the key term in Levinas’s account 
is uniqueness.
But uniqueness is a tricky term, as the first inclina-
tion we might have is to understand it from a third-
person perspective, that is, as the question concerning 
the characteristics and capacities each of us has that 
make each of us different from everyone else. This we 
might refer to as the idea of uniqueness-as-difference, 
which would bring us immediately back to questions 
of identity and identification and to a perspective on 
uniqueness from the outside, where, from an abstract 
point, we can make clear how each human being is 
in some respect different from every other human 
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1 being. As I read his work, Levinas hints at the need for 
asking a different question about uniqueness, which 
is not the question “What makes me unique?”—the 
question about what I have that makes me different 
from everyone else—but the question “When does it 
matter that I am I?”. The latter question does precisely 
not ask about everything I have or possess that would 
distinguish me from others, but looks for situations, 
for existential events, where my uniqueness is “at 
stake” and therefore where I am at stake. The situa-
tions Levinas has in mind are those where someone 
calls upon me in such a way that the call is addressed 
at me and no one else. These are situations where 
the call comes to me, and where it is only I who can 
respond. They are, in other words, situations where 
we encounter a responsibility, which is the reason 
why Levinas (1985) suggests that responsibility is 
“the essential, primary and fundamental structure 
of subjectivity” (p. 95). 
Alfonso Lingis (1994) provides the helpful exam-
ple of a case where a friend who is dying asks to see 
you. Such a question, Lingis argues, is a question that 
only addressed you, as the friend is not interested in 
just seeing someone—she wants to see you and no 
one else. This is a question, therefore, that literally 
singles you out. It is a question that burdens you 
with a responsibility. It is for you to take up this 
responsibility or walk away from it. When Zygmunt 
Bauman (1993) summarises Levinas’s insights by 
writing that, for Levinas, responsibility is “the first 
reality of the self” (p. 13), he captures what is going 
on here extremely well, as we could say that it is 
only in encounters where there is a responsibility 
for me that my uniqueness begins to matter, that 
my uniqueness is “at stake,” that I am at stake. Here 
uniqueness is not a matter of difference—a third per-
son perspective—but a matter of irreplaceability—a 
first person perspective. Uniqueness, as Levinas puts 
it, is about doing “what nobody else can do in my 
place” (Levinas, 1989, p. 202). There is of course no 
one who can force us to take on the responsibility we 
encounter. In that regard, it is important to see that 
Levinas is not describing this as a duty, as something 
we must do. Nor does he see it as a biological fact, that 
is, as something we cannot not do. On the contrary, 
we could say that, in a rather strange sense, human 
freedom also means that we have the possibility to 
walk away from the responsibility we find ourselves 
in, and this is entirely up to each of us individually. 
We cannot take on this responsibility for another 
human being, nor can we force another human being 
to act in a particular way if, that is, we respect their 
subject-ness, if, that is, we encounter them as subjects 
in their own right, and not as objects of our actions 
and intentions (this has important implications for 
education, to which I will return below).
A final thing to mention here is that the respon-
sibility in relation to which my uniqueness begins to 
matter always and structurally comes from the out-
side rather than that it is generated by me. It does not 
start from a feeling or a need to be responsible for the 
other or to care for the other. The responsibility in the 
face of which my uniqueness begins to matter and in 
response to which I might realise, in that particular, 
singular moment, my subject-ness, therefore always 
appears as an interruption of my “immanence,”’ an 
interruption of my being with and for myself. Levinas 
(1989), in some cases, describes human subject-ness 
as “the very fracturing of immanence” (p. 204), or in 
slightly less “strong” language, as the moment where 
“the Same—drowsy in his identity” is awakened by 
the other (p. 209). 
Both Arendt and Levinas thus try to show how our 
subject-ness is not in our own hands. But whereas 
Arendt’s account starts from my initiatives and is 
about how they need to be taken up by others in 
order to become real, Levinas puts this on its head 
by showing how the possibility for my subject-ness 
starts from the outside, and only then becomes an 
“issue” for me, and only and uniquely for me. And 
the issue is whether I respond to the responsibility I 
encounter and, in that moment, “realise” my subject-
ness, or whether I walk away from it. If Arendt gives 
us a theory of the way in which our subject-ness is 
not in our own hands—and thus provides us with a 
third person perspective—Levinas (1989) gives us 
something that is more like a phenomenology that 
engages with the question of subject-ness from a 
first-person perspective, by showing how subject-
ness is ultimately a matter for each of us individually 
to figure out. While, as mentioned, theory might help, 
theory can never replace the existential question; 
theory can never replace the existential challenge 
and can sometimes actually become an excuse for 
not having to engage with it.
The Middle Ground 
between World-Destruction 
and Self-Destruction
If the previous two sections give us some insights 
into what it means to exist as subject, I now wish to 
shift to the second part of my thesis about the educa-
tional task, which is the suggestion that what matters 
educationally is to exist in and with the world in a 
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grown-up way. Grown-up-ness, as I have already sug-
gested, has to do with an acknowledgement of what I 
have referred to as the alterity and integrity of what 
and who is other. If this acknowledgement is not to 
be understood as generosity from my side—where I 
would “allow” the world to exist which, formulated 
in this way, actually sounds rather arrogant—then 
how might we make sense of what this means? One 
way to do this, is through a discussion of what might 
happen when we—or in Arendtian language: our 
initiatives—encounter resistance.
The encounter with resistance, that is, the encoun-
ter with the fact that something or someone resists 
our initiatives, is a tremendously important experi-
ence as it shows that the world is not just a construc-
tion of our mind or our desires, but actually has an 
existence and hence an integrity of its own. The 
experience of resistance is, in that regard, a worldly 
experience; an experience that we are somewhere, not 
just anywhere. What do we do, or what might we do, 
when we encounter resistance? Let me look at three 
possible options.
When our initiatives meet resistance, our first 
response might be one of irritation in face of the 
encounter with something that frustrates or blocks 
our initiatives, or at least limits our ability to execute 
our initiatives. We might “blame” that which offers 
resistance for this, and might try to enforce our 
intentions—we could also say: enforce our will—
upon that which offers resistance. This is partly 
what needs to be done in order for our initiatives to 
become real, to arrive in the world, but if we go too 
far in enforcing our will upon the world, we reach a 
point where our own force becomes so strong that 
it destroys the (integrity of the) very “entity” that 
offers resistance. If we think of our encounters with 
the material world, we may find ourselves pushing 
so hard that the material we want to shape and form 
breaks under the pressure. In this moment we end up 
destroying the very thing that offers resistance. We 
might say, therefore, that at this end of the spectrum 
of the encounter with resistance there is the risk of 
world-destruction.
From here we can begin to see what lies at the 
other end of this spectrum, because a second way to 
respond to the experience of resistance and, more 
specifically, to the frustration of this experience, is to 
withdraw from what offers resistance, to step away 
from it. This is where, when faced with the experience 
of resistance, we say that the situation is too complex 
and too difficult for us, that we don’t have the energy 
or appetite to persevere, and we thus begin to with-
draw ourselves from the encounter with what offers 
resistance—in plain English: we back off. While again 
there may be good reasons for doing so—as it leaves 
space for that which offers resistance to exist and 
be in the world—the risk here is that we ultimately 
withdraw ourselves from any engagement with the 
world, and ultimately withdraw ourselves completely 
from (existence in) the world. In a similar vein, we 
could say, therefore, that we give up or destroy the 
very conditions that would allow us to exist in the 
world in the first place. Hence, the extreme we find 
here is the risk of self-destruction.
World-destruction and self-destruction are the 
extreme responses to our encounter with resistance, 
our encounter with the world; responses where we 
actually end up outside of the world, in a place of 
non-existence. They therefore also mark the middle 
ground where existence—worldly existence, exis-
tence in and with the world—is possible and literally 
takes place. We might refer to this middle ground as 
“dialogue,” as long as we do not think of dialogue 
as conversation, but as an existential form, a way of 
being together that seeks to do justice to all partners 
involved. Dialogue is, in this regard, fundamentally 
different from a contest. A contest is an existential 
form aimed at bringing about winners and losers. 
Also, a contest comes to an end once someone has 
won, whereas dialogue is an ongoing, never-ending 
challenge. An ongoing, never-ending Aufgabe, we 
might say. A contest requires a confined burst of 
energy; staying in dialogue requires ongoing and 
sustained energy, attention and commitment. 
The middle ground is not an easy place to be, 
which partly helps to understand the attraction of the 
extremes of world-destruction and self-destruction, 
as they provide escapes from the difficulty of exist-
ing in and with the world. Sometimes we do need 
to retreat from the difficult middle ground, perhaps 
to recharge our batteries or gain a perspective on 
what we are encountering there. And sometimes 
there is a need to “push”’ for something better, which 
also shows that the middle ground is not the space 
where just anything should exist. But it is ultimately 
only in the middle ground that existence is pos-
sible. The middle ground is therefore not a place 
of pure self-expression, but rather a place where 
our self-expression encounters limits, interrup-
tions, responses—which all have the quality of the 
frustration Arendt talks about, and the fracturing 
of immanence Levinas refers to. But with Levinas 
we can also say that these experiences awaken us 
from our drowsy state of being outside of the world, 
of being just with ourselves. These experiences tell 
us that we are in it “for real”—where what I do mat-
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1 ters, where how I am matters, and where I matter. 
To stay in the middle ground thus requires that we 
affirm and perhaps even embrace this difficulty as 
the very difficulty that makes our existence possible. 
Staying in the middle ground thus requires a desire 
for a worldly existence, an existence outside of our-
selves—ek-sistence. And the educational task, as I 
have suggested, is to arouse such a desire in another 
human being.
“Grown-up”-ness, the 
Desired, and the Desirable
Given how I have described grown-up-ness in the 
beginning of this article, that is, not as the outcome 
of a developmental process but as an existential 
quality or quality of existing, it may perhaps not be 
too difficult to see that the middle ground between 
world-destruction and self-destruction is the place 
where a grown-up way of being with what and who 
is other might be achieved. By referring to grown-
up-ness as something that might be achieved, I am 
again highlighting the existential thrust of the line 
of thinking I am putting forward in this article. This 
means that grown-up-ness is not to be understood as 
something we can posses or claim to have. It is also 
not something we can claim to be, if by such a claim 
we would mean that it is securely in our possession 
and would permeate everything we do. Whether we 
manage to achieve a grown-up way of being with 
what and who is other, is something that is always at 
stake and always a question. In each new situation we 
may, after all, fail to engage in a grown-up way, and 
while it is important that we keep making an effort—
if, that is, we desire to exist rather than being with 
ourselves—we can never be certain of the outcome 
of our efforts, and can even be surprised (and disap-
pointed) by our own actions and responses.
While grown-up-ness is not an ideal term, par-
ticularly not because of its reference to processes of 
growth and thus to the suggestion that grown-up-
ness is the outcome of such a process—which I have 
argued that it is not—grown-up-ness does refer to a 
state where we have managed to overcome another 
way of acting with and responding to what and who 
is other; a way which I have characterised as non-
grown-up, but which we could also call “infantile” 
(but see below), “egocentric,” or with a term sug-
gested by Levinas, “egological,”3 that is, following 
the logic of the ego, not the logic of what and who is 
3 In the English translation, the actual term Levinas uses is 
“egology” (Levinas, 1969, p. 35).
other. The egological way of being is entirely gener-
ated by the desires of the ego, without asking—and 
this is the crucial distinction, whether, how, or to what 
extent such desires are desirable, both for the ego’s 
existence in and with the world and for the world in 
and with which the ego seeks to exist.
This means, and this is important, that grown-
up-ness is not a suppression of desires, but a process 
through which our desires receive a reality check, so 
to speak, by asking the question what we desire is 
desirable for our own lives and the lives we live with 
others. Such a question—and this is educationally 
important—always poses itself as an interruption of 
our desires. Such an interruption partly manifests 
itself through the experience of resistance, and we 
could even say that when we encounter resistance 
we not only encounter the world but at the very same 
time we encounter the desires we have in relation to 
the world. 
When we encounter resistance we could say 
that the world is trying to tell us something—and 
perhaps we could even say that the world is trying 
to teach us something. But the interruption can also 
be actively enacted when someone asks us whether 
what we desire is actually desirable. And of course, 
we may also reach a situation where this question 
becomes our own question, where it becomes a living 
question in our own lives (I return to the educational 
significance of this below.) In all this, therefore, the 
ambition is not to eradicate our desires, but to give 
them a worldly form and quality so that they can 
support and sustain a grown-up way of being in and 
with the world. Spivak (2004, p. 526) uses the inter-
esting expression of an “uncoercive rearrangement 
of desires” and gives this as her definition of what 
education is and what it is about.
By using the opposition of “grown-up”’ and “infan-
tile” in this existential way I am not trying to give 
children a bad name or assume that all adults are 
able to exist in a grown-up way. On the contrary, by 
understanding the infantile and the grown-up, the 
egological and the non-egological as two different 
ways in which we can engage with what and who 
is other, I aim to make visible that both options are 
open for children and for adults—and perhaps we 
should say that we can only ever know retrospectively 
whether we have turned out in a particular situation 
as child-like or adult-like. Our age or the size of our 
body are no secure indicators for that.
A final observation to make here is that while 
we do need to pay attention to what is there to do 
uniquely for each of us, we should not forget that 
the environments in which we act and live send out 
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strong and influential messages as well. To the extent 
to which modern life is structured by the logic of 
capitalism, we could say that we live in an environ-
ment that is precisely not interested in interrupting 
and limiting our desires, but rather is focused on the 
multiplication of our desires, so that we will desire 
more and therefore will buy more and more. Such 
an “impulse society” (Roberts, 2014) is precisely not 
interested in our grown-up-ness but rather prefers 
that we remain infantile, as that’s where the money 
is being made.
The Educational Work: 
Interruption, Suspension, 
and Sustenance
If this has brought us sufficiently, albeit not perfectly 
close to an understanding of what it might mean to 
exist in and with the world in a grown-up way, that 
is as subject, I now wish to say a few things about the 
particular educational work4 that might contribute to 
making such an existence possible.
Perhaps the most important point to make, par-
ticularly in response to fashionable ideas of educa-
tion as having to do with the promotion of the child’s 
development, with helping students to develop all 
their talents and reach their full potential, is that 
the main principle of education aimed at making 
a grown-up existence in and with the world pos-
sible is that of interruption. This line partly follows 
from Arendt’s reflections on the condition of being 
subject—as they highlight that our subject-ness is 
not in our own hands. But it follows most explicitly 
from the line of thought pursued by Levinas and his 
suggestion that the event of my subject-ness always 
appears as an interruption of my immanence, the 
being for and with myself, and as an awakening out 
of this drowsy state.
Whereas Levinas’s formulations may sound 
abstract, the main insight here is relatively simple if 
we see, for example, that we all have talents for good 
and for evil, and that both morality and criminality 
can be understood as outcomes of developmental 
processes. This immediately shows that the educa-
tional task can never just be the promotion of the 
child’s development, but needs to be concerned 
with the question which development is desirable 
and which is not—which means that the funda-
mental educational gesture is that of interrupting 
and questioning development. It also shows that 
4 I use the word work here in a very loose sense, with no par-
ticular theoretical pretensions.
the educational task can never just be about letting 
students develop all their talents and reach their full 
potential because, again, what we should be after is 
the interrogation of talents and potential in order to 
explore which talents are going to help and which 
talents are going to hinder grown-up ways of being 
in the world—which necessarily requires an inter-
ruption rather than just letting everything emerge, 
grow, flow and flourish. To suggest that education is 
just about supporting the child’s development, just 
about letting each student develop their talents and 
reach their full potential, is therefore an educational 
lie—a lie that is not only misleading towards children 
and students, but is also misleading as a vocabulary 
for educators to describe and even understand what 
their task actually is.
Whereas interruption is, in this regard, the most 
important term as it highlights the fundamental 
structure of the educational work, it is important to 
see that interruptions can be performed in a number 
of different ways—some of them educational (that 
is aimed at enhancing grown-up-ness) and some 
of them not. One uneducational way to enact inter-
ruption is in the form of what we might call “direct” 
moral education, where the interruption is enacted as 
a direct judgement on the side of the educator about 
the child and their beginnings, that is, in the form of 
condemnation—“Wrong!”—or praise—“Right!” The 
problem here is not the feedback in itself, which is 
important and to a certain degree useful and impor-
tant, but the fact that the judgement comes from the 
educator and is applied to the child, as this gives the 
child no time and no opportunity to appear as subject 
in relation to such a judgement. The child remains 
no more than an object of the educator’s judgement 
(or, for readers who can cope with a little play with 
words: the child remains subjected to the educator’s 
judgement).
We can also put this in terms of the distinction 
between the desired and the desirable. This dis-
tinction, as I have suggested, marks the difference 
between an infantile and grown-up way of existing, 
but it is important to read this carefully, as the idea 
is not that “desires”’ are the infantile way and “desir-
able” the grown-up way. It is rather that the grown-up 
way is characterized by the “ability”—but perhaps 
we should call it a willingness or a desire itself—to 
make and ponder the distinction between one’s 
desires and their possible desirability. The differ-
ence, in other words, is that between being an object 
of one’s desires—or in a more precise formulation: 
being subjected to one’s desires—and being a subject 
of one’s desires.
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1 As long as the educator decides for the child or 
student which of their desires are desirable, the 
child and student remain objects of the educator’s 
intentions and activities. The key educational chal-
lenge, therefore, is not simply to tell the child or 
student which of their desires are desirable, but 
for this question to become a living question in the 
life of the child or student. This requires anything 
but direct moral education, but rather hints at the 
need for opening up literal and metaphorical spaces 
where the child or student can establish a relation-
ship with their desires, just as it requires the cre-
ation of a gap between the desires as they arise and 
the actions that follow from them. The educational 
principle here is that of suspension—a suspension 
in time and space, so we might say—that provides 
opportunities for establishing relationships with 
our desires, make them visible, perceivable, so that 
we can work on them.5 This, to make the point one 
more time, is not a process in which we overcome 
or destroy our desires—our desires are, after all, a 
crucial driving force—but select and transform our 
desires so that we move from being subjected to our 
desires to becoming a subject of our desires. This is 
the “uncoercive rearrangement of desires” Spivak 
(2004, p. 526) writes about which is perhaps a little 
less uncoercive as her formulation suggests and in 
addition to rearrangement may also involve a change 
in the intensity of our desires.
Interruption and suspension both take place in 
the middle ground with the ambition to keep the 
student in the middle ground, as it is there that 
grown-up-ness can only ever be achieved. This means 
that a third dimension of the educational work—and 
perhaps this is the most important and most pre-
carious dimension—is that of supporting the student 
with staying in the difficult middle ground. It involves 
providing sustenance, in any imaginable form, so that 
the student can endure the difficulty of existing in and 
with the world. Yet, as the middle ground is the place 
where the student encounters the world, part of the 
educational work here is also to make this encoun-
ter possible and give it form—which has to do with 
pedagogy and curriculum. More specifically the task 
is to give form to the experience of resistance, so that 
there is a real possibility to experience the world in 
its alterity and integrity. It thus also means to provide 
5 In Biesta (2017), I discuss in much detail the particular con-
tribution that the arts can make in this process.
time to encounter the experience of resistance and 
work with it—or with the nice interesting expression: 
to work through it. 
The work of the educator here is also to “stage” 
the experience of resistance as important, meaningful 
and positive and have an eye for the many different 
subtle ways in which this can be done. This is not 
about making things difficult for the sake of making 
them difficult, but in order to acknowledge its crucial 
significance vis-à-vis the question of being in the 
world as subject. Viewed in this way, it is a warning 
against taking all resistance out of education, by mak-
ing it flexible, personalised, and completely tailored 
to the needs of the individual child or student. Such 
strategies run the risk of isolating the student from the 
world rather than supporting the student in engaging 
with the world. To show the student where and how 
the encounter with the experience of resistance is 
educationally meaningful—which is not just by tell-
ing them that this is so, but can take many different 
forms—is important in order to keep the child away 
from the two extremes of world-destruction and 
self-destruction. Or, in opposition to the “negative” 
language of “keeping away,”’ the work of the educator 
is to arouse the desire in the student for wanting to 
stay in the difficult middle ground.
Transforming Power into 
Authority: The Beautiful 
Risk of Teaching
If interruption, suspension and sustenance are, in a 
sense, rather concrete activities, there is one further 
dimension of the work of the teacher that is barely, if 
at all, in the hands of the teacher. This dimension has 
to do with the transformation of power into authority. 
The issue here is that although educational interrup-
tions are “aimed” at the subject-ness of the student, 
when enacted they appear as acts of power, at least 
in those cases where students did not ask for such 
interruptions to occur—which is probably where all 
education starts. The ambition of educational inter-
ruptions is to “turn” students towards the question 
whether what they desire is what they should be 
desiring, and much of the work of the educator is 
about creating time, space and forms so that students 
can encounter their desires, examine their desires, 
select and transform them. Whereas the question of 
the desired and the desirable is introduced by the 
teacher—as a powerful interruption—the ambition 
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is that this question becomes a living question in the 
life of the student. At stake here is the question as 
to what should have authority in our lives, and the 
question of authority is precisely about coming into 
dialogue with what and who is other. It is about let-
ting something or someone have power in our lives. 
It is about authorising what and who is other, it is to 
let it speak, so to say, to make it into an author.
What we hope as teachers whose teaching is aimed 
at the subject-ness of our students is that at some 
point the student will turn back to us and acknowl-
edge that what in the first instance appeared as an 
unwanted interruption—an act of power—did actually 
contribute to their grown-up existence in and with 
the world, their grown-up subject-ness. When such 
a turning happens, and only when it happens, we can 
say that power—which is always monological and one-
directional—has transformed into authority—which 
is always dialogical and relational (Bingham, 2008). 
But we never know whether such a “return” may hap-
pen, and we never know when such a “return” may 
happen, which may well be long after the student has 
disappeared from our view and our (professional) life. 
This means that any teaching aimed at the subject-ness 
of the student is first of all risky in that its outcomes 
are unpredictable. But it is also risky because we, as 
teachers, risk ourselves, as we are always enacting 
power without often knowing whether this power will 
“return” as authority, as accepted and acknowledged 
power. But this should not prevent us from taking this 
risk, because with out it education would not happen 
either. It rather should help us to understand much 
better what the risky nature of teaching and education 
more generally is, if it is aimed at the subject-ness of 
the student, or if it is aimed at arousing the desire in 
another human being for wanting to exist in the world 
in a grown-up way.
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